Monday, October 29, 2012

David Remnick: NETANYAHU’S DARK CHOICE

    The New Yorker,  October 29, 2012

netanyahu-lieberman-465.jpg
It’s not often that spy masters and security chiefs represent the democratic impulse and the conscience of a nation adrift. But in Israel, where the hard right holds power and the left has all but collapsed, that is, to some extent, the case.

A couple of months ago, I reported a piece in Israel describing how many present and former military and intelligence chiefs were, in defiance of political custom, speaking out publicly against the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who was doing all he could to press for a unilateral attack on Iran and its nuclear facilities. The most outspoken of those security chiefs was former Mossad director Meir Dagan, who said a unilateral attack would do little to derail the Iranian program; instead, he said, it would unite the Iranian leadership and, quite possibly, ignite a regional war. (Dagan was clearly ailing when I met with him in Tel Aviv. His health was worse than he let on; Dagan just got a liver transplant in, of all places, Belarus.) Since then, Dagan and his allies seem to have won a victory, at least for the moment. Despite a clownish performance in September at the United Nations, at which he brandished his famous Wile E. Coyote cartoon of a nuclear bomb, Netanyahu backed off his bellicose talk. For now, anyway.

The political voice of the security chiefs is not limited to the Iran issue. Not long ago, I saw Dror Moreh’s brilliant documentary “The Gatekeepers,” in which the last six chiefs of Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic-security agency, describe their experiences during the occupation and their common belief that the failure to reach a just accommodation with the Palestinians will lead, inevitably, to disaster for everyone concerned.

Over three years, Moreh spoke with Avraham Shalom (1981-1986), Yaakov Peri (1988-1994), Carmi Gillon (1995-1996), Ami Ayalon (1996-2000), Avi Dichter (2000-2005), and Yuval Diskin (2005-2011). These Shin Bet leaders served in Labor and Likud governments; they were instrumental in the occupation; they set up informer networks, gave arrest orders, oversaw everything from targeted assassinations to brutal interrogations. They are, politically, a mix, but they all conclude that the occupation is illegal, immoral, brutal, and self-destructive. None of them seem to have any faith in the political leadership and rue the leadership’s capitulation to the settler movement. Perhaps the most moving, and sickening, sequence of the film revolves around the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, an event that effectively ended the hopes of Oslo. Carmi Gillon, who was the chief of Shin Bet at the time, tells Moreh that Rabin’s killer, a religious fanatic named Yigal Amir, “won big time.”

Here in the U.S., we have been concentrating on our own election, our own storms. In Tel Aviv, twenty thousand people came to a rally marking the seventeenth anniversary of Rabin’s death. Netanyahu and other officials gathered on Mount Herzl, in Jerusalem, to remember Rabin, who exemplified the Israeli realist who had thrown in his lot for peace and accommodation with the Palestinians. The Israeli President, Shimon Peres, who won the Nobel Peace Prize along with Rabin and Yasir Arafat, said that Rabin had “laid the foundation for the future peace agreement with the Palestinians.”

Netanyahu saw it his way. Rabin, he said, “recognized the Iranian threat. There is great turbulence all around us—in historical proportions.” According to the news wire Ynet, Netanyahu went on to say, “Since the murder, Iran’s proxies seized control of half of the Palestinian people, the half that’s in Gaza, and they are looking to take over the other half in Judea and Samaria”—the West Bank.

A few days earlier, Netanyahu announced that he and his Likud Party had formed an alliance with the Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, and his Russian-dominated Yisrael Beiteinu Party (the Our Home Israel Party) for elections on January 22nd. In the 2009 elections, Netanyahu ran to the center-right (at least by the standards of an ever more conservative political map), but now he has thrown in with the country’s most prominent xenophobe. Lieberman, who emigrated in 1978, lives in the West Bank settlement of Nokdim. He admires Vladimir Putin. He is so given to outrageous statements about Arabs that foreign reporters are rarely allowed to talk to him.

Political insiders in Israel know that Netanyahu and Lieberman distrust each other, but their newfound alliance makes it almost impossible for a center-left bloc to win in January. Their leaders are, to the last, extremely weak.

One of those centrist leaders, Tzipi Livni, told the Jerusalem Post that if Lieberman were to get a post like Defense Minister in a new government, disaster was inevitable. “We are talking about an existential threat to the State of Israel,” Livni said. “Netanyahu is losing his senses and is gambling with Israel's security out of political and survivalist considerations.” She continued, “Lieberman was the one who threatened to bomb the Aswan dam. Is this the Defense Minister that Israel needs right now?”

Aluf Benn, the editor-in-chief of Haaretz, wrote that Netanyahu, by forming this alliance, had “formed a war cabinet that will lead Israel into a confrontation with Iran.” Benn argued that victory in January for the right-wing coalition would ward off Israeli opposition to an attack on Iran, leaving only the United States “to delay, or even prevent, a command to the Israel Air Force to take off for Iran.”

Another columnist at the paper, Ari Shavit, who has sometimes written sympathetically about Netanyahu, wrote that the new coalition “turns Israel’s center-right prime minister into a prime minister held captive by dark forces. If until yesterday Netanyahu could still claim to be the Israeli Ronald Reagan or Rudy Giuliani, yesterday he turned into Glenn Beck. Even his Republican friends won’t be able to accept the fact that he has crawled into political bed with one of Vladimir Putin’s admirers.”
I am not so sure. Mitt Romney, who famously told the donors of Boca Raton that the Palestinian issue is best just “kicked down the field,” does not seem inclined to debate Bibi Netanyahu, no matter what coalition he forms.
Photograph by Lior Mizrahi/AFP/Getty.



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Pentagon Nixed 1998 U.S. Nuclear Scientists’ Probe of Iranian Programme

IPS NEWS SERVICE

Sunday, October 28, 2012

Iranians Win Sakharov Free-Thought Prize

Nasrin Sotoudeh and Jafar Panahi of Iran are the winners of this year's Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.

Reza Aslan: Rejected by Religions, but Not by Believers

Excellent article by Reza Aslan

Mossad's former chief on how it is the Republican US presidents who usually throw Israel under the bus.

 The New York Times

New Book-Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State, By David Patrikarakos

THE INDEPENDENT

Is Iran being set up to fail ? Lessons of 2003 war with Iraq

Learning from Iraq lessons.

The unfolding human catastrophe in Iran -

AL JAZEERAH

When is a cyberattack an act of war?

THE WASHINGTON POST

Saturday, October 27, 2012

Are the Saudis Bankrolling Israel’s Mossad?

COUNTERPUNCH

What the Cuban missile crisis teaches us about Iran

October 26, 2012                   REUTERS
By Frederick Kempe
Bob Schieffer of CBS News struck the right note when he opened this week’s presidential debate on foreign policy by reminding viewers it was “the 50th anniversary of the night that President Kennedy told the world that the Soviet Union had installed nuclear missiles in Cuba, perhaps the closest we’ve ever come to nuclear war.” He called it “a sobering reminder that every president faces at some point an unexpected threat to our national security from abroad.”
After setting the stage, however, Schieffer missed an opportunity to ask an important follow-up: As commander-in-chief, what lessons would President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney draw from the Cuban missile crisis? Did they agree with Graham Allison — whose Essence of Decision [1] is one of the most popular books on the crisis — that today’s effort to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran is “a Cuban missile crisis in slow motion”? Allison said recently in anNPR interview [2] that we are heading “inexorably toward a confrontation at which an American president is going to have to choose between attacking Iran to prevent it becoming a nuclear weapons state or acquiescing and then confronting a nuclear weapons state.”
The wrong conclusions drawn from the Cuban missile crisis, perhaps the most studied foreign policy event in American history, have misguided U.S. leaders ever since the Kennedy administration.
On one side stand those like Leslie Gelb, who wrote for Foreign Policy [3] about “The Myth that Screwed Up 50 Years of U.S. Foreign Policy.” He argues that by promulgating the argument that Kennedy forced Khrushchev to capitulate in Cuba “by virtue of U.S. military superiority and his steely will,” we’ve created a culture that eschews compromise and has led to misadventures from Vietnam to Iraq. In fact, argues Gelb, it was mutual concessions that ended the crisis:
The crisis concluded not with Moscow’s unconditional diplomatic whimper, but with mutual concessions. The Soviets withdrew their missiles from Cuba in return for U.S. pledges not to invade Fidel Castro’s island and to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
In his rebuttal [4] to Gelb, Stephen Sestanovich of Columbia University argued:
American concessions were simply not the key to resolving the crisis. It’s obviously inconvenient for anyone who favors a calm, compromising approach to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, but the truth is that what softened Khrushchev up – unhinged him, really, was the threat of U.S. military action.
The problem with both these arguments is they focus too much on the details of the 13-day crisis, which lasted from Oct. 16-29, 1962, and not enough on what Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had seen in the first two years of the Kennedy administration that made him willing to risk placing atomic weapons for the first time within 15 minutes of Washington. In the storm of commentary that has accompanied this week’s anniversary, what all the pundits and historians have missed is one indisputable fact: Berlin caused Cuba.
It was Khrushchev’s perception of Kennedy, gained during the various stages of the Berlin crisis of 1961 (resulting in the border closure and construction of the Berlin Wall in August), that convinced him that the president would acquiesce to missile deployment in Cuba a little more than a year later.
In April of 1961, Khrushchev watched in happy disbelief as Kennedy botched the Bay of Pigs fiasco, neither discarding the mission (hatched by the Eisenhower administration) by CIA-backed Cuban exiles to remove Fidel Castro from power, nor giving it the teeth to succeed. As he said to his son Sergei at the time, “I don’t understand Kennedy. Can he really be that indecisive?” Khrushchev drew the comparison with his own more resolute and bloody response to the Hungarian uprising of 1956.
Six weeks later at their Vienna Summit, which the Soviet leader agreed to only after the Bay of Pigs debacle, Khrushchev so shocked Kennedy with his threats of war and his challenges to U.S. post-war rights in Berlin, that the president told New York Times writer James Reston it was the “worst day of my life.” Regarding his Cuban misadventure, he told Reston the Soviet leader “thought anyone who was so young and inexperienced to get into that mess could be taken. And anyone who got into it and didn’t see it through had no guts. He just beat the hell out of me,” he told Reston. “I’ve got a real problem.”
Kennedy was right. In August of 1961, just two months after the Vienna Summit, Kennedy acquiesced to the Berlin border closure, famously saying he preferred a Wall to a war. He believed that by allowing Khrushchev to shut down Berlin’s border, resolving the refugee flood that threatened East Germany and the Soviet empire, he would gain a more cooperative negotiating partner on nuclear weapons issues. Instead, Khrushchev followed with the resumption of nuclear testing and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
As I argue in the epilogue of my book [5]Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth:
 Critics called Khrushchev’s scheme to put nuclear missiles in Cuba a reckless gamble, but from the Soviet leader’s perspective it was a calculated risk based on what he knew of Kennedy. At the end of 1961, he told a group of Soviet officials he had learned Kennedy would do almost everything to avoid nuclear war. “I know for certain,” he had said, “that Kennedy doesn’t have a strong background, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge.” Regarding Cuba, he told his son Sergei that Kennedy “would make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree” to the deployments.
The lesson for presidents past and future is a crucial one. American leaders’ greatest chance of avoiding war is through clear and consistent communication with adversaries, reducing the chance of unwanted conflict through miscalculation or misunderstanding. Khrushchev only risked deploying atomic weapons in Cuba because he had grown confident that he could get away with it.
Cuba’s lesson for Iran, Allison argues, is in the risk of ignoring the importance of communication: “Don’t let this reach the point of confrontation. The risks of catastrophe are too great.”

Join the debate: Do you think Ahmadinejad will go quietly?

Ahmadinejad v. The Islamic Republic

Israel’s Super-Hawk Merger Makes Iran War the Election’s Central Issue

Why hardliners in Israel want to keep Iran as the central issue in their agenda ?

The Israel Elections: Expect More Surprises

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Climate Change we either Pay Now, or Pay Later -

AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT
Bahman Baktiari

Stephen M. Walt: Getting Iran to say 'uncle' might not be smart

 FOREIGN POLICY


Bahman Baktiari

Sunday, October 21, 2012

Stanford-NYU study finds 3,000 killed by drones: 900 civilian (incl 200 children) & only 41 "high value target

Report: CIA chiefs may face charges over Pakistan drone strikes

Bahman Baktiari 

US and Iran: Could Romney be tougher than Obama? Unlikely.

Short of conducting a unilateral military strike or declaring war against the Islamic Republic, a Romney administration would be faced with the same legislative options on Iran as President Obama, who has already administered them.  THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Bahman Baktiari 

Ex-Mossad chief Efraim Halevy: 'The Iranians, in their heart of hearts, would like to get out of their conundrum."

 AL MONITOR

Bahman Baktiari 

Financial Times: Worsening Economic situation forces Iranian parliament to react


Financial Times
October 21,  2012
Najmeh Bozorgmehr

Iran’s parliament has revised its budget law in a bid to curb the populist policies of President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad amid criticisms that these policies have made the country more vulnerable to sanctions.
MPs on Sunday approved an urgent plan “to support investment in development [projects] and national production and revise the budget law” after a week of discussion.

Under the revised law, the government is barred from using oil revenues or the difference between the official and open market currency exchange rates to pay for a widespread programme of welfare payments, and is threatened with prosecution if it violates the terms of the law.

Iran’s economy has been rocked by international sanctions imposed in response to its disputed nuclear programme. An EU ban on Iran’s oil imports, which came into force in July, and US banking sanctions have hit the currency market hard, leading to a more than 50 per cent fall in the rial since January.
Iran’s fundamentalists are in a tense power struggle with the president, who is barred by the constitution from running for a third term in elections next June but is believed to be seeking to have a close ally succeed him.

His critics argue that his lavish spending on public welfare payments has come at the expense of longer-term development projects and is the main reason behind a rapid rise in consumer prices and sharp drop in domestic production – curbing the economy’s ability to withstand sanctions.
According to official figures, inflation and youth unemployment stand at 23.5 per cent and 28.6 per cent respectively, but economists believe real the figures are far higher.
Ali Larijani, Iran’s parliament speaker, who is one of Mr Ahmadi-Nejad’s main opponents and may run for president, said last week that the legislative body had decided to focus on the economy to help support domestic industries.
This was necessary, due to “the sensitive conditions” resulting from sanctions, he said, while insisting that sanctions were not the main cause of the country’s economic woes. Instead, he blamed the government for the deteriorating economy, including the closure of half of the country’s industrial complexes due to financial problems.
At the heart of the attacks against the president is his decision to cut about $100bn in subsidies on energy and other basic commodities which began in December 2010 as a much-needed reform of the country’s state-dominated economy.
This plan has placed an increasingly heavy burden on the economy because the government decided to give almost all the money saved from the subsidy cuts – not half as was required by the law – back to the public in the form of cash compensation payments, in spite of the inflationary impact of such a move. Whereas half of the money saved was supposed to have been used to compensate producers for rising energy bills.
More than 60m Iranians, out of a population of 75m, are receiving IR455,000 ($37.11 at the official exchange rate) each month as compensation for the rise in prices of basic goods.
The government, which is believed to be facing a huge budget deficit, has also been accused by some MPs of trying to exploit sanctions by making money out of fluctuations in the currency markets.
The legislative body on Sunday also restricted government access to the National Development Fund, into which 20 per cent of oil revenues is placed for long-term development projects, amid speculation that the government was planning to use the fund to help meet its budget shortfall.
Other parts of the revised budget bill are intended to increase investment in upstream oil and gas projects and to stop the government from using the proceeds from the privatisation of state-owned companies for any purpose not specified in the budget law.
“If the subsidies plan were carried out properly and legally,” said Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, a former president and chief critic of the current government “it could have helped boost the country’s economy and [domestic] production and deter foreign threats [sanctions].”
It is not clear yet how the government of Mr Ahmadi-Nejad -- which is occasionally accused of ignoring parliament approvals – will respond to the new budget restrictions. But analysts doubt there will be any cut in the welfare payments or change to the scheme – at least until the presidential election in June.



Lauren Rozen: White House denies report that US and Iran agreed to direct talks

THE BACK CHANNEL

Bahman Baktiari 

U.S. Officials Say Iran Has Agreed to Nuclear Talks

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Bahman Baktiari 

Corner Where Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan Meet

THE NEW YOR TIMES

Israel Has Nuclear Weapons, But Only Iran Has Nuclear Power

FORBES

Bahman Baktiari 

Tuesday, October 16, 2012

Study: Tens of thousands will die in case of military strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities

The NUCLEAR GAMBLE

Bahman Baktiari 

Inside political Islam: the borders between moderates and extremists

EGYPT DAILY NEWS

Bahman Baktiari 

Key Questions for the next President of the United States: Should America go to war with Iran ?

GLOBAL BRIEF

Bahman Baktiari 

As sanctions crush rial's value, Iranians point fingers at Ahmadinejad

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Bahman Baktiari 

Freedom of Expression in Egypt’s Draft Constitution

CENTER FOR LAW AND DEMOCRACY

Nelson Mandela's Legacy

THE CAIRO REVIEW OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Bahman Baktiari 

Turkey and Iran hold surprise talks on Syria

Syria crisis: US concerned weapons reaching jihadis - live updates

Bahman Baktiari 

Saturday, October 13, 2012

Saudi Arabian ammunition in Syria more evidence of foreign countries diverting weapons & ammo to support insurgency

 IMPORTANT ARTICLE

Bahman Baktiari 

IRGC Publication: “Is the Revolutionary Guard After War?”

The lead article of the Revolutionary Guards-affiliated weekly, Sobh-e Sadeq, by Commander Yadollah Javani, head of the Revolutionary Guards’ Political Bureau, bears the title, “Is the Revolutionary Guard after War?”   READ THE FULL ARTICLE

Bahman Baktiari 

Graham Allison: Israel's credibility problem on Iran.

Red Lines in the Sand - By Graham Allison
Israel's credibility problem on Iran.

by GRAHAM ALLISON   Foreign Policy Magazine  OCT. 12, 2012

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been campaigning for an unambiguous red line to stop Iran's nuclear advance. In an infelicitous foray into American politics last month, he took to the Sunday morning television shows to insist that Barack Obama act to stop Iran, saying, "You have to place that red line before them now." Smarting from the Obama administration's refusals, he challenged the U.S. president with the zinger: "Those in the international community who refuse to put red lines before Iran don't have a moral right to place a red light before Israel." Then, at the U.N. General Assembly meeting, he held up a cartoon of a bomb and with a marker drew a red line, declaring that Iran could not be allowed to produce a stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium sufficient (after further enrichment) for its first nuclear bomb. On the current trajectory, as laid out in the public reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran will reach that point in about six months.

As he addresses Iran's nuclear challenge, the prime minister's frustration stems from his knowledge that Israel and the United States have been complicit in a process of drawing red lines they say Iran will never be allowed to cross, watching Iran cross those lines, and then retreating to declare the next obstacle on the path to a bomb to be the real red line.

Addressing the U.S. Congress in 1996, Netanyahu, then serving his first term as prime minister, argued that Iran's acquisition of a nuclear bomb would have "catastrophic consequences, not only for my country, and not only for the Middle East, but for all mankind." He warned that the deadline for preventing that outcome was "getting extremely close." Israel declared Iran's possession of a civilian nuclear power plant "unacceptable" until it became operational, when the Israeli Foreign Ministry declared this "totally unacceptable."

Nor was this the last time Israeli politicians and officials have announced a point of no return, only to move the goal posts later. For Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2004, it was development of a "technical capability" for operating an enrichment facility. As Iran approached that capability, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described the tipping point not as the capability, but as the "enrichment of uranium" itself. After Iran began enriching uranium, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert drew a new line in 2006 as enrichment "beyond a limited number of cascades."





The pattern is clear: As Iran has crossed each red line, Israel has retreated to the next and, in effect, hit the repeat button. From conversion of uranium, to production of low-enriched uranium (less than 5 percent) that can be used as fuel for civilian power plants, to a stockpile of low-enriched uranium sufficient (after further enrichment) to make one nuclear bomb, to a stockpile sufficient for half a dozen bombs, to enrichment beyond 5 percent to 20 percent medium-enriched uranium, to operation of centrifuges enriching to 20 percent at the deep underground facility at Fordow, to achievement of a undefined "nuclear weapons capability," Israel's warnings have grown louder, but with no more effect.


Bahman Baktiari 

Sunday, October 7, 2012

Human Trafficking on the rise in India

 "Human Trafficking on a rise in India, no data on crime available," says the latest data released last week by India's National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB).  "The offenses pertaining to kidnapping and abduction of children, procurement of minor girls, buying or selling of girls for prostitution has gone up by as much as 180%."
See ARTICLE

Book Review: The Realist Case for Global Reform by William E Scheuerman

 The Realist Case for Global Reform by William E Scheuerman.,  Oxford: Polity Press, 2011. 200 pp, £16.99 (paperback). 978 0745650302

Bahman Baktiari 


Iran sanctions now causing food insecurity, mass suffering

"Yet again, the US and its allies spread mass human misery though a policy that is as morally indefensible as it is counter-productive. " 

See article in the GUARDIAN


Financial Times Editorial: Israel thinks twice about Iran attack

Since the start of this year, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, has never missed an opportunity to hint that his country might attack Iran’s nuclear programme at any moment. In speech after speech, he has repeatedly asserted that Iran’s nuclear programme is crossing a threshold – a zone of immunity – when its striving for the bomb becomes irreversible. He has warned that no state has the moral right to stop Israel taking military action. For months, his government has privately warned western leaders that it could launch a strike ahead of November’s US presidential election – putting pressure on a reluctant Barack Obama to provide military support to finish the job.This week, Mr Netanyahu finally put an end to this tactic. In a speech to the UN General Assembly, he unveiled a new timetable for possible military action. He argued that Iran will cross a “red line” next summer when it has amassed enough highly enriched uranium for one nuclear bomb. At that point, he said, a military strike would become necessary. 

His threat of military action continues. But the significance of his speech is that an attack this year – the “October surprise” – is off the agenda.Israel’s concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran are legitimate, but an Israeli attack was never warranted while there is still time for diplomacy and sanctions to make Iran back down. In this respect, Mr Netanyahu’s threat of an air strike in 2012 was premature. The Israeli military establishment openly opposed the idea, saying Israel could not attack Iran alone. The Obama administration resisted his efforts to force America’s hand

The Iranians refused to take his blustering seriously. Finally, Israel’s prime minister blinked. The question now is whether the Obama administration should sign up to his new “red line.” It should not. Even if Iran amasses enough highly enriched uranium for one bomb next summer, the regime will need another three months to convert it to weapons grade material. 

This would be visible to international inspectors. It would also give the US time to plan a military response. Besides, if the US were to adopt the new red line, it would most likely hinder chances of a diplomatic settlement with Iran.Reaching a diplomatic settlement should be the goal of western policy at this stage. In 2013, the US must reach out to Iran and seek a deal to halt its enrichment activities. The Iranian regime should also wake up to reality. Its claim to be enriching uranium for peaceful purposes is not credible. It should strike a bargain.

In the meantime, Israelis might pause for thought. Israel has every right to fear an Iranian bomb. But Mr Netanyahu’s posturing this year has done his people no favours at all. 



Bahman Baktiari 

Dante’s Inferno and Paradise in Modern Times: Good Italy, Bad Italy

Dante’s Inferno and Paradise in Modern Times: Good Italy, Bad Italy

Bahman Baktiari 


Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber’s Biographer, Dies at 90

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Post Arab Spring, Salafists gaining hold

The Washington Post

Bahman Baktiari 

Book: KofiAnnan's 'Interventions: a Life in War & Peace' reviewed by Alec Russell

A taut and timely memoir from former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan.   
FINANCIAL TIMES REVIEW
Bahman Baktiari 

Thursday, October 4, 2012

Is Islam an Obstacle to Democracy?

Muslims Have Pushed for Democracy

Bahman Baktiari 

Thomas Hobbs: Britain’s first modern philosopher, The significations of his words

 The Economist

Bahman Baktiari 

The Economist:Iran’s nuclear programme: A red line and a reeling rial

Sanctions may be taking their toll as Israel’s prime minister tries to set a new red line to block Iran’s nuclear plans.

 ARTICLE

Bahman Baktiari 

The Iranian Currency Crisis: Three Possible Scenarios

By JAY NEWTON-SMALL | @JNSmall

During my trip to Iran last month, the owner of a chicken shop in Shohada Square, a lower middle class neighborhood in southern Tehran not far from the bazaar, complained to me about the fluctuating price of chicken. “Yesterday, I had some orders from some regular customers. So I sold them chickens for 50,000 rials each,” he said. “But when I went to buy the chickens today, the price had spiked 5,000 rial overnight. I had to pay 55,000 rials for each chicken, so I lost some money. It would be fine if this was a one-time thing, but it keeps happening. The prices, they’ve fluctuated so much the last couple of months.”

The Shohada chicken-seller must have had quite the ride this week–as have consumers and merchants across Iran with he rial devalued suddenly and dramatically by 40%.  As a TIME reporter in Tehran notes, the bazaar closed on Wednesday in part because merchants no longer knew how to price their products in such an unstable market, and in part to protest President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s economic policies. There have been increasing labor strikes for months around Iran, but unrest in the bazaar is a dangerous indicator for the Iranian regime: It was striking bazaaris who began the successful take-down the shah in 1979.

Most experts see three possible outcomes – or a combination of these three steps:

1)  The regime falls.

There is a lot of anger at Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement of the economy, but there’s also not a lot of love for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei. When I was in Tehran last month there was much speculation on the street that Ahmadinejad was stepping back – he is a lame duck with his term expiring next summer — to allow Khamenei to take some of the bullets for once. And the frustration I heard was equally apportioned between the two men. “Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, they’re all the same,” one small business owner told me. “None of them care about the economy, it’s all ideology to them. Winning the argument.”

That said, many in Iran worry what would be on the other side of regime change. They fear Iran devolving into an Iraq, or Syria: a precarious state, plagued by sectarian violence. “Better the devil you know than the devils you don’t,” the small business owner said. “At least this is a system we know how to game.”

2)  The regime makes a run for a bomb.

Most Iranians I met believed that Iran had a right to nuclear energy and, even, a nuclear bomb. “If Pakistan and India have them, if Israel has one, why not us?” asked a woman named Douri (not her real name). Douri did not believe a bomb to be worth the economic pain of the sanctions, but she said she would absolutely stand behind the regime if Iran were to be attacked.

Uniting the Iranian people behind an otherwise unpopular government wouldn’t be the only benefit of making a run for a bomb and provoking an attack by Israel and/or the United States. Such an attack would surely break the fragile coalition against Iran and gut the sanctions. Plus, as my colleague Tony Karon noted on Thursday, obtaining a bomb acts as a deterrent. “The regime is likely to pursue the nuclear bomb more energetically than before believing that the sanctions will be removed once Iran has become a nuclear power,” says Ali Alfoneh, an Iran expert at American Enterprise Institute in Washington.

3)  Economic but not political collapse.

Speaking of the fragile sanctions coalition, there is evidence that Iran could be getting some help from China and Russia. The Melal Hotel group is the largest private hotel chain in Iran. The sanctions have forced them to halt construction on new hotels – negotiations to buy elevators from the Swiss have fallen through and getting a hospitality partner has proven difficult. But business within the country is still booming, despite the disappearance of European travelers. “We have a lot of Russian and Chinese businessmen,” says Bamdad Faghihi, the hotel group’s Dubai representative. “Business with China is up day by day due to the sanctions.” China’s buying of Iranian oil hasn’t slowed in recent months despite the sanctions. In July they bought 20 million barrels, according to Bloomberg News.

Sanctions only work if there are no back doors. If China and others are buying Iranian crude on the sly and paying with gold, they are providing lifelines to Tehran’s economy and the regime. Because of this, Europe is considering a fresh wave of sanctions at their next ministerial meeting on Oct. 15 targeting loopholes where crude is leaking out of Iran. And the U.S. is also set to implement a new round off sanctions this fall. Are they looking to strike a deathblow to the Iranian economy? “I wouldn’t phrase it quite like that,” said on senior European diplomat, “but that is the intent, yes.”

One option is that Ahmadinejad gets thrown to the wolves and used as a scapegoat to appease the street. As he was speaking at the United Nations last week, one of his top allies was arrested for financial fraud. And Khamenei’s displeasure with Ahmadinejad has never been more evident. That said, the President is already a lame duck so making an example of him is an almost cosmetic fix. Speculation was rampant when I was there that Ahmadinejad would be the last president of Iran and that Khamenei would simply do away with the troublesome office when Ahmadinejad’s term expired. That day may come sooner than later.

But even without Ahmadinejad, the Iranian regime has to find a way to stabilize the economy.  “I suspect the regime will gain control of the street but long term there’s a problem of a people without political rights and economic options,” says Ray Takeyh, an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “How they manage it remains to be seen.”

Bahman Baktiari 

Israel ‘does not have a blank check to harm American interests,’ says former US defense secretary

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Bahman Baktiari