Thursday, May 31, 2012

John Renard, Islam and Christianity (2011, University of California Press)


 

Three observations immediately strike the reader of John Renard’s 2011 Islam and Christianity: Theological Themes in Comparative Perspective.  First, the text contains a tremendous wealth of factual content presented in an accessible and enjoyable style.  Second, two refrains echo throughout Renard’s side-by-side presentations of Christianity and Islam: “The Christian practice / understanding / history of X is analogous to the Islamic practice / understanding / history of Y,” and “Though X and Y may appear at first glance to be similar, closer inspection reveals several key differences.”
Third, Renard is not simply cataloging historical data, but subtly is doing something theological in his presentation.  Renard’s work reads less like an amalgamation of research which the author conducted in specific anticipation of writing the book and more like a reflection on an enormous repository of knowledge which an authoritative scholar has internalized over the course of many decades (he has been teaching at Saint Louis University since receiving his PhD from Harvard in 1978).
The book is grand and sweeping – Renard’s admission about the difficulty of encapsulating various debates within biomedical and sexual ethics might be a caveat for the entire book: “The breadth and depth of possible topics is far too vast and complex to be described adequately in a survey such as this” (174).
While the scale may be daunting – he summarizes themes and trends in fields ranging from the philosophy of architecture to moral theology to institutional pedagogy to heresiography – Renard clearly has a strong grasp on the high points (as well as eclectic and lesser known details) across broad swaths of both Christianity and Islam.  The perspective is reasonably balanced, especially when one normalizes for the author’s admission that both he and his likely readers share a dominantly Christian hermeneutical lens (72, 75, 224, compare 46, 56, 203 for possible impositions of Christian moral categories).
The reader is left wondering whether Renard intends his book to supply the foundation for, or start to participate in, the “world theology” approach to comparison which he borrows from Robert Neville (225).  Before engaging analysis, however, it might be beneficial to say a few words about the content and structure of Islam and Christianity.
The book may be divided into three “sections,” albeit sections which are woven throughout the text and are not coterminous with Renard’s explicit structure (the book devotes one “part” each on the areas of communal origins, normative beliefs, institutional development, and ethical engagement, with each “part” divided into chapters which in turn treat multiple related topics).
The first “section” (to impose terms not found in Renard’s own organization) might be called “philosophical catalysts,” and is found primarily in the preface, prologue, introduction, and epilogue.  The second might be called “data,” and is found wherever Renard presents information on a single tradition in coherent pericopes.  The third might be called “analogical assessment” in which the author examines the data side-by-side, drawing out interesting comparisons and flagging potential points of disconnect.  The text of Renard’s four “parts” alternates between “data” and “analogical assessment” so that material being considered is always of a manageable size, broad enough to facilitate comparison, but specific enough to make the comparison interesting.
When this presentation and analysis is complete, Renard transitions back to the “philosophical catalyst” material in order to offer “some suggestions about where the path of theological dialogue might lead” (221).  The subsequent epilogue seeks a way beyond the limitations of Hans Küng’s inclusivism and Kenneth Cragg’s dialogical approach (as well as John of Damascus’s polemical and Thomas Aquinas’s Scholastic engagements) to a practicable “world theology.”  In the epilogue Renard uses grippingly imaginative imagery and the reflections of Neville, Ross Reat and Edmund Perry, C.S. Pierce, and Richard McCarthy to suggest that “world theological” encounter between Christians and Muslims is imperative, possible, and rewarding.  Christians ought “to swim” in “the sea” of Islam because, after all, “the water’s fine” (232).
One helpful, though ancillary, dimension of Islam and Christianity is that it contains enough factual material to function simultaneously as “Christianity 101” and “Islam 101” courses.  While the purpose of the book may be theological, the reader cannot help but marvel at the even-handed and comprehensive presentation of key facts.  Renard has a good grasp on what is important, foundational, and formative across a multitude of disciplines in both religious traditions.  The enormous scope of the book often reinforces his thesis that both traditions are incredibly complex and dynamic, though this type of survey demands a certain amount of generalization and lack of attention to complicating details which might simultaneously work against Renard’s complexity argument.
We will return to the challenges of breadth shortly; the reader will note, however, that an appreciation for complexity, nuance, contextuality, fluidity, and evolution comes across in both Renard’s style and his content.  He succeeds in evoking “surprise” or “shock” “at the nuances and diversity that characterize” Islam and Christianity (90).
Another helpful insight is spelled out most explicitly on page 97 but implicitly undergirds much of Renard’s analysis.  He suggests that similarities between Christianity and Islam can be attributed both to the binding tie of shared human experience and to the strikingly similar questions which Christians and Muslims have asked, while the contextuality of history and the differences in the traditions’ premises can explain the variance between their answers (compare 46, 88, 108, 112, 154, 208).
The book includes three particularly useful foci.  First, Renard pays attention to traditions outside “normative” Sunni Islam and Roman Catholic Christianity.  His special attention both to Eastern Orthodox and to LDS theologies, as well as to the diversity within Protestantism, is especially commendable.  At the same time, his vantage point does not pretend to a false neutrality – Renard is careful to note those points at which isolationist and conservative expressions of the faiths are hoisted with their own petards (e.g. 108).  Second, the theme of power and its interaction with theological thinking is extremely useful for those asking the questions of relatedness and divergence between Christianities and Islams.
He notes repeatedly the “complex interface between theology and politics” and asserts commendably that, “all politics has theological implications and…all theologies have political implications” (112, 129).  Third, Renard highlights narrative theology (though without mention of the recent phenomenon alternately called “post-liberalism” and “narrative theology” represented by Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, and David Kelsey), which he considers to be an antecedent to creedal formulations in both traditions (69, 72).  The analogies Renard uncovers between early Christianity and early Islam in the use of narrative seem to be particularly fruitful ground for further reflection.  However, his use of analogical comparison – which is his most pervasive and fundamental methodological tool – runs into limitations because of the massive scope of his work.
Renard is vague on two points regarding his use of analogy.  First, he is never quite clear about whether similarity or difference “wins the day” when the two are collocated.  His pattern is to note similarities but then to uncover differences within them; is the take-home message that differences are bounded by larger similarities or that the eagerness of universality is to be tempered by the reality of particularity (compare 27, 97, 192)?  He is silent in this regard, though this silence itself might be a characteristic of his sought-after “world theology.”  Second, Renard seems to conflate morphological and genealogical relatedness between the two traditions, rarely acknowledging that similarities reflect common heritage rather than parallel thought processes (especially 67; compare 31, 55, 159).
Another complicating factor in Renard’s use of analogy is the problem of moving targets.  Sometimes Renard aligns Sunnism with Protestantism against the parallel between Shi‘ism and Catholicism (118, 133f., possibly 192, 200) while at other times the primary analogy is between Sunnism and Catholicism (170, 173).  Hadith are sometimes comparable to the New Testament (38) and sometimes have no analogue in “Christian theological literature” (77).  Finally, the Prophet is sometimes compared to Jesus (both are revered and imitated “founding figures”).  In this analogy the Christian scriptures (particularly the New Testament and more specifically the Gospels; compare 88) are parallel to the Qur’an (27, 42, 48, 157).  Other times the analogy compares the Prophet with Mary (following Cragg) and the Qur’an with Jesus (110, 224).  This analogical ambiguity deserves deeper reflection, especially when the reader considers the analogy of questions which undergirds much of the book.  Because early Christians asked similar questions about the nature of Christ to those which early Muslims asked about the Qur’an, does Renard’s frequent “Jesus is to Muhammad as the Bible is to the Qur’an” analogy undercut his vital observation about parallel interrogatives?
Finally, Renard’s use of analogy is weakened by the sheer scope of his work.  He misses potential analogues between Christianity and Islam simply because he does not go into sufficient detail in his presentation of data.  For example, his distinction between direct and indirect intercessory prayers in the (Roman Catholic) Christian tradition is a barrier to analogy with Islam, a barrier which deeper thought might overcome (203).  Also, his claim that Christians disagree about the number of Sacraments (two or seven) but that all Muslims agree on the number of Pillars (five) imposes a needless dissimilarity, as Twelver (ten) and Sevener (seven) Shi‘ites have different enumerations of the Ancillaries of Faith.
The enormous bounds of Renard’s work leads him to three further difficulties.  First, he often fails to account for complexity: he presents the Sunni-Shi‘i divide as very early and unequivocal (45), reads a revisionist “irenic” quality into normative Christian-Muslim historical cohabitation (57), presents oversimplified theologies of time in both traditions (62), ignores Constantine’s attitude toward Judaism (88, 91), presents Christian beliefs about hell and Muslim beliefs about the death of Jesus as monolithic (110), describes Adam as an Islamic prophet (a notion which is found in Hadith sources but not made explicit in the Qur’an; 18, 76, 93, 133, etc.), and often neglects potentially helpful nuances in both traditions (compare 65, 93, 160, 192).  Such generalizations are inevitable in a work of this magnitude and in no way discredit Renard’s theological project, but they do provide a caution about the potential pitfalls in such an ambitious comparative work.
The second – and related – difficulty with this broad scope is that Renard misses a number of opportunities to solidify his analogies through additional detail.  His descriptions of contemporary Christian theology and classical Islamic reflections on God exemplify this.  In not mentioning (in Christianity) the important work of process, liberation, and feminist theologies and (in Islam) the classical Islamic sciences and siramaterial, he leaves many potential analogies undrawn (8, 24, 88, 190, though he briefly discusses sira on page 17).  He commits what statisticians refer to as “Type I errors” when he concludes that the two traditions are ultimately different even though more nuanced readings might challenge such differences (e.g. 181).  But perhaps the most pernicious difficulty inherent to any book which attempts “much too brief summary of an enormously complex subject” (32) is the potential that generalized statements have for error.
Renard succumbs to this difficulty on at least four points.  He claims that “most Evangelicals” have moved away from language which describes the Christian scriptures as inspired or inerrant (36).  He suggests that Paul is equally the author of Romans and 2 Timothy (42).  He claims that creeds play no role in Islamic ritual life (88).  Finally, he states that the Council of Nicea affirmed that the Holy Spirit is homoousios with the Father (95).  These generalized and problematic statements would benefit from deeper reflection and nuanced qualification, but the pace of Islam and Christianity does not allow for such subtlety.
In addition to the difficulties inherent in Renard’s recourse to analogy and the breadth of his work, a final methodological question lingers.  The author seems to suggest that analogical readings of the two traditions, which exposes differences within similarities, can contribute to the Nevillian project of “world theology” and circumvent the inevitable problems of polemical, Scholastic, inclusivist, and dialogical approaches.  Thrice he invokes the image of Jesus and the Samaritan woman in John 4 (41f., 228, 258 n.17).  The scandal of the interaction (besides the power dynamics of gender, upon which Renard focuses) is that Jews and Samaritans typically had nothing to do with each other.  This mutual abhorrence derived from differences within similarity, precisely the phenomenon which Renard finds again and again in the comparison of Christianity with Islam.  At the risk of oversimplifying a complex history, we might say that Jews disliked gentiles (with whom they had nothing in common) but despised Samaritans (to whom the analogies were plentiful).  Does establishing a “similar-but-not-identical” relatedness between Christianity and Islam advance or hinder the cause of “world theology?”  The answer is perhaps yet to be seen.  In any case, Renard has opened countless doors for deeper comparative reflection.

Wednesday, May 30, 2012

Professor Stephen M. Walt: "International Affairs and the Public Sphere" - What effect does scholarship have on policy ?


International Affairs and the Public Sphere

Stephen M. Walt, Harvard University
Most social scientists would like to believe that their profession contributes to solving pressing global problems. Indeed, the United States and many other modern societies subsidize university-based research and teaching on the assumption that scholars will develop useful knowledge about today’s world, communicate that knowledge to their students and to the broader public, and, where appropriate, offer rigorous, well-informed advice to interested policymakers.

Legacy of the Arab Spring: The Question of Independence and Sovereignty


 H. Akin Unver

Today, the Arabs are rising against their despotic regimes and leaders in search for liberty and freedom. Yet, the legacy of a similar uprising – the Arab Revolt of 1916 – to expel four-century-old Ottoman rule carries many lessons for the Arab Spring. Over-reliance on foreign help and international third parties to deal with an indigenous cause eventually enabled these outside sources to shape and eventually hijack that indigenous cause. Even though the Arab countries eventually gained their independence they have been struggling with direct or indirect manifestations of colonialism, as well as domestic legitimacy and sovereignty crises. The legacy of the Arab Spring must therefore be answered with reference to the 1916 Arab revolt – and by discussing the issue of independence and sovereignty separately.

Legacy of the Arab Spring: The Question of Independence and Sovereignty 

Amir Faisal, the leader of the 1916 Arab Revolt and a firm believer in the idea of Arab unity had hypothesized that once the victors of World War I would concede Arab independence and help them establish their local competence, the “natural influences of race, language and interest” would soon draw all Arabs into one people. Yet, Faisal requested from the Great Powers of World War I that they lay aside their thoughts of profit and their infighting: “…we ask you not to force your whole civilization upon us, but help us to pick out what serves us from your experience”. In return he conceded, the Arabs could offer the Great Powers “little, but gratitude[i]. The fate of the 1916 Arab Revolt and that of Faisal developed in parallel, eventually marking a lesson in history for the nations who outsource the shortcomings in their national-political unity to the goodwill of international third parties. And it shows us that, in the ‘market’ of diplomacy, ‘gratitude’ and ‘goodwill’ are not exchangeable commodities.
 
Rather than an all-out Arab revolt, it is more accurate to define 1916 as a Hashemite revolt[ii], developing around the clan and allies of Sharif Husayn bin Ali of Mecca and his sons – perhaps the best known being Faisal bin Husayn, who led the armies of the Hashemite revolt to Damascus in 1918, ending four-centuries of Ottoman rule in the Middle East. The prevailing Arab narrative was that it was the ‘Western betrayal’ that had denied the Arabs their own kingdom, highlighting the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration that later materialized in the concluding treaties of the Paris Peace Conference. Yet, this narrative can be challenged by arguing that the Hashemite revolt had no chance of success against the Ottoman army without the main British army of Allenby as it was in fact Britain that fought the main bulk of the Ottoman army, ultimately ‘saving’ the Arabs from Ottoman control. Furthermore, the fact that the Hashemite revolt was organized and equipped by the colonial office in Cairo and with the hands-on involvement of T. E. Lawrence, ultimately enabled London to exercise as much influence and weight it desired on the post-Arab revolt settlements. The Hashemite nature of the revolt and representation at the Paris Peace Conference prevented it from being a genuine Arab nationalist movement, which become even more explicit following the Hashemites’ loss of sovereignty as a result of the Allies’ response to Faisal’s “little, but gratitude” with a land-grabbing frenzy.
 
Post-World War II period on the other hand witnessed successive independence declarations, much of which lacked full sovereignty, as these were externally granted or consensual independences that had more to do with the demise of Britain and France, than the rise of nationalist mobilizations in the Middle East. Iran for example, could declare its independence only after British and Soviet troops withdrew in 1941, Lebanon in 1943 with a strong French oversight, Syria in 1944 following British pressures on France to withdraw, and Jordan (1946), Iraq (1947), Egypt (1947) all declaring their independence as a part of general British decolonization and with negotiated consent. The primary problematic of Arab independence emerges here: Mashriqi independence came not as a result of a unified, focused and sustained national mobilization, which managed to overthrow foreign patronage, but were granted long after sporadic and insufficiently united uprisings had been pacified into varying degrees of cooperation with colonial rule. Once these colonial administrations withdrew, they left behind post-colonial administrations that lacked sufficient legitimacy to rule the newly created territories of the Middle East in the absence of colonial troops.
 
The question of legitimacy and sovereignty in Mashriq has since then become the fundamental problematic of Middle Eastern politics, whereby these post-colonial administrations have been frequently challenged by indigenous forces, eventually falling to a wave of military coups instigated by nationalist, young army officers. Nasser’s 1952 coup, as well as Sadat’s ‘Corrective Revolution’ of 1971 in Egypt, Boumediene’s 1965 coup in Algeria, Qassem (1958), Arif (1963), al-Bakr (1968) and eventually Saddam Husayn’s (1979) coups in Iraq, Syria’s successive coups by al-Zaim, al-Hinnawi, al-Shishakli, (1949), 1954 coup, ending with Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid’s coup of 1966 and Gaddafi’s 1969 coup in Libya are all part of this post-Ottoman and post-colonial search for legitimacy in the Middle East. The political behavior of these dictatorships then began animating the perceived autocratic rule of the Ottoman sultans and the repressive approach of the colonial administrators, effectively creating a hybrid policy of domestic colonialism and legitimation-through-repression. Perhaps the best-known extension of this political behavior has been the Mukhabarat: the intelligence directorates of the Mashriq that dealt with domestic dissent and opposition rather than foreign espionage, eventually rendering Mukhabarat synonymous with state terror and repression.[iii] Similarly, the armies of the Middle East since then, performed domestically more than externally, as an extension of dictatorial control, rather than a national fighting tool.
 
Through this post-colonial dictatorship period, Arab countries were independent, but their people were not domestically sovereign. Leaders of the Arab people behaved much like war-time military administrations of invaded countries that maintained constant domestic military-intelligence activity to protect the regime and the state.
 
In retrospect, the British-Hashemite expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from the Middle East brought about 30 years of colonial period, which was followed by more than half century of post-colonial dictatorial regimes. In other words, since 1918, there has always been a barrier between the Arabs of Mashriq and a regime with a generally accepted legitimacy.
 
 
Arab Spring Legacy: Between Faisal and Kemal
 
The Arab Spring, has the potential to be an epoch-ending event, mainly because it ends the post-colonial period of the Middle East. While rising against their oppressive regimes, the Arabs are also rising against the ghosts of the colonial and post-colonial periods.
 
Yet, this in itself doesn’t bring about a solution to the century-old legitimacy crisis in the Middle East. Although revolting and overthrowing a regime is half of the job, failure to replace these regimes with more legitimate, sovereign, democratic and representative structures will mean the failure of the project. If there is indeed a ‘Tahrir spirit’ or an ‘Arab Spring ideology’, then it has to bring full, complete and unquestioned sovereignty to the people. This means that future regimes must be accountable domestically, as well as internationally, establishing their countries’ ties with the West on equal footing.
 
However (and perhaps unfortunately) the Arab Spring, since its inception, is increasingly being debated within the context of how the United States can help, shape or expedite it and how U.S. oriented social media tools (smartphones, Twitter, Facebook, Youtube) helped these movements to develop – often ignoring the fact that the Arab Spring movements mobilized primarily in the traditional fora: mosques, universities and coffee houses. More problematic perhaps, is that many Arab commentators and analysts cannot not talk about the Arab Spring independently from how American help; either with forcefully overthrowing dictatorial regimes or with establishing post-revolution administrations.[iv] Some other analysts argue that the United States has a humanitarian and ethical responsibility to help save Arabs from their dictators. This argument is becoming increasingly more pronounced within the context of Syria[v], for example and already became a reality with the Libyan case[vi]. Paradoxically, the same policy debate warns that the post-Arab Spring administrations will not be particularly pro-American and in the event that democratic systems are established in the Arab world, they will eventually have to channel some of the anti-Americanism and anti-Israeli sentiments in the public.[vii] It is then argued that the U.S. must simply ‘deal with it’ when it comes to this expected post-Arab Spring anti-Americanism and must at least, in the medium-term, has to accept the reality of this outcome.
 
The question then becomes: Why should the United States, as a rational and benefit maximizing international actor, support the Arab Spring, knowing that they will bring about anti-American administrations to power? Perhaps more importantly, in the event of a foreign help ‘success’ (either militarily, in the case of Libya and prospectively, Syria or via diplomatic weight in the case of Egypt’s military council) how can those opposition forces that demanded foreign help in the first place escape the memories of post World War I and will in one way or another subject themselves to foreign patronage and involvement? At the very least, how will they resist to the post-war pressures for resource, investment or political concessions coming from the U.S., Britain or France? Wouldn’t this imply returning back to 1916 and again outsourcing an indigenous cause to international third parties, just to be dominated by these third parties in return?
 
A possible and unexpected answer to these questions may perhaps be given by revisiting the saturated debate on the function of Turkey in the Arab Spring. If there can indeed be a ‘Turkish experience’ that can serve as an inspiration to the Arab Spring, rather than a poorly defined ‘Turkish model’[viii] or anachronistic ‘common Ottoman history/legacy’[ix] argument, it has to be the one thing that (interestingly) nobody is talking about: the fact that the Republic of Turkey was the first independent and sovereign country emerging from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, who also managed to sustain its sovereignty uninterruptedly until today. Indeed, complete Turkish sovereignty had come without any reliance on foreign help[x], but emerged from resistance to all foreign involvement with a unified and concentrated effort of the people rallying around a military commander who took his legitimacy tangibly from his in-field successes against the foreign armies during World War I and his victory in protecting the remnants of the Ottoman Empire from foreign occupation. Furthermore, the real ‘Turkish model’ includes in itself the fact that the elite that secured national freedom by fighting against Western colonial powers and their extensions, became pro-Western and pro-modernization forces of the new republic, proclaiming a multi-party democratic system after a long period single-party rule.[xi]
 
If the Arab uprisings, hopefully termed as ‘spring’ will end up as success, our metrics of measuring it must involve primarily that one thing the Arabs have been longing for: full sovereignty and representative, legitimate governments. Otherwise the uprisings will represent nothing more than successive ‘youth bulge’[xii] crises of young men seeking more opportunities of upward social mobility and can simply be subdued within the context of the rentier state paradigm[xiii], without necessarily requiring a democratic-representative government. In the words of Gunnar Heinsohn: “80 percent of world history is about superfluous young men making trouble[xiv].
 
Yes, the Arabs deserve to, and should be free. But the extent to which they can be free depends on the legacy they will choose to inherit; either as revolutionaries that will dismantle the defunct, old order and improve their political structure fundamentally, or as a divided, opportunist movement without a specific goal which relies on foreign help to achieve its primary objectives. If the former, Arabs will have to showcase their mobilization capacity, political skills and drive, not only to overthrow their dictators, but also to maintain interim administrations and build up representative systems on their own, without American or otherwise outside help. This includes indigenous, regional interferences, such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Then, in the second level, the Arabs must re-establish their relationship with the outside world independent of external patronage and oversight, always keeping in mind that countries that rely on foreign help to deal with their domestic problems (be it mandate, supervision or rent relationship) will always succumb to an administration that lacks complete legitimacy. If a movement cannot succeed in replacing the old order on its own and necessitates outside intervention, then the source of that intervention will become a function of the spoils of war. The movement then, has no right to complain about the so-called ‘greed’ of that third party. Just as it was unrealistic for Faisal to ask for foreign help, but non-intervention afterwards, it will be unrealistic for the Arab Spring to ask for foreign help, but also non-intervention later on.
 
The fate of the Arab Spring lies between two legacies: that of Faisal, who outsourced the cause of his own people to Britain and ended up rendering his people subservient to British demands, whose fall-out created laid the foundations of modern anti-Western thought, and that of the Turkish Republic, whose founding elite and people demonstrated a single, all-out and all-or-nothing effort to achieve full sovereignty and then established close ties on equal footing with the Western countries.
 
This is the first time since Nasser that the Arabs are tested so decisively in their quest for full sovereignty and to showcase their mobilization capacity as a nation. This is not necessarily a call for an ethno-political Arab unity in the Nasserian sense, but rather a call for radical responsibility for the Arabs to unite along an ideal that will create the political structures they wish to live in. In this quest, the Arabs must make a decision however, between the legacy of Faisal and Kemal. 

Dr. Ünver is the Ertegün Lecturer of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, Near Eastern Studies department. Previously he was a joint post-doctoral fellow at the University of Michigan’s Center for European Studies and the Center for the Middle East and North African Studies, where he authored several articles on Near Eastern politics. He earned his B.A. in International Relations from Bilkent University (2003) and MSc in European Studies from the Middle East Technical University (2005). He received his PhD from the Department of Government, University of Essex. For a list of publications and media commentaries, please visit: www.akinunver.com/scholar.

[i] Amir Faisal, quoted in:  J. C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, (Yale University Press, 1979).
[ii] On the question of Arab loyalties through the 1916 revolt, see: James Gelvin, Divided loyalties: nationalism and mass politics in Syria at the close of empire, (University of California Press, 1997).
[iii] On this, see: Hilal Khashan, Arabs at the crossroads: Political identity and nationalism, (University of Florida Press, 2000) pp. 82-87.
[iv] See for example: Shadi Hamid, ‘What the Obama and American liberals don’t understand about the Arab Spring,’ The New Republic. October 1, 2011, http://www.tnr.com/article/environment-energy/95538/arab-spring-obama-re... Raghida Dergham, ‘The West’s responsibility to protect the Arab Spring,’ Al-Arabiya, November 6, 2011, http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2011/11/06/175698.html.
[v] Anthony Elghossain and Firas Maksad ‘A responsibility to Syria: Set up humanitarian corridor,’ The National, February 15, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/a-responsibility-to-syria-set-up-a-humanitarian-corridor.
[vi] Jeremy Kinsman, ‘Libya: A cause for humanitarian intervention’ Institute for Research on Public Policy, October 2011, http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct11/kinsman.pdf.
[vii] Robert J. Cristiano, ‘Arab Spring – American Winter,’ New Geography, November 29, 2011,http://www.newgeography.com/content/002503-arab-spring-american-winter; Deborah Amos, ‘Is the Arab Spring Good or Bad fort he U.S.?’ NPR, January 9, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/01/09/144799401/is-the-arab-spring-good-or-bad-for-the-u-s.
[viii] In the apt words of Sebnem Gumuscu “there is no ‘Turkish model’ of an Islamist democracy; rather, there are Muslims in a secular-democratic state working within a neoliberal framework; Sebnem Gumuscu, ‘Egypt can’t replicate the Turkish model: But it can learn from it,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 12, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/01/12/egypt-can-t-replicate-turkish-model-but-it-can-learn-from-it/8z6z.
[ix] The proponents of the ‘Ottoman legacy’ argument often neglect the fact that the collective Arab memory and folk literature remembers four-hundred-year-old Ottoman rule in the Middle East through its dreaded outlets: the military-governor (pasha), the janissary garrison and the tax collector. Also the fact that the ‘Ottoman legacy’ was overthrown by the 1916 revolt renders much of the ‘common history’ argument invalid from an operational, political perspective. On this, see: Roger M. A. Allen and Donald Sidney Richards, Arabic Literature in the post-classical period, (Cambridge University Press, 2006)
[x] Bolsheviks financially supported the Turkish War of Independence, but the Bolshevik influence on the Turkish Republic was kept at a minimum and ended in the first few years of the republic, therefore it cannot be compared to the British involvement in the Hashemite revolt. On the Bolshevik aid policy to Turkey, see: Edward Halett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-23, (W. W. Norton & Company, 1985).
[xi] Some works consider the period 1925-47 in Turkey as ‘dictatorship.’ While this statement was always strongly rejected by Ataturk or Inonu, it is possible to argue that Turkey was going through an elite-driven modernization and nationalization political process that took place in Russia, Italy, Germany, Spain and even de Gaulle’s dictatorial tendencies in France which follows the post World War II Middle Eastern dictatorship patterns. In other words, Turkish and European dictatorial periods belong to the same period, eventually switching to multi-party democratic systems. Certainly in Turkey, it was the single-party regime itself that had transformed the political system into a multi-party democracy; albeit imperfect. On the other hand, Middle Eastern dictatorships emerged after 1947 and none of them switched to a democratic system.
[xii] Youth bulge is a term used to define demographics with excess young (especially male) population, which causes high unemployment and subsequent rapid and dramatic socio-political changes such as revolts, wars and social unrest. For a short summary, see: Lionel Beehner, ‘The Effects of Youth Bulge on Civil Conflicts,’ Council on Foreign Relations, April 27, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/society-and-culture/effects-youth-bulge-civil-conflicts/p13093.
[xiii] The theory of the ‘rentier state’ stipulates that countries that receive substantial amounts of revenues from the outside world, in exchange for natural resources on a regular basis tend to become autonomous from their societies, unaccountable to their citizens, and autocratic. If such countries manage to distribute this wealth coming from foreign rent to their citizens sufficiently, it reverses the taxation-representation dynamic that is essential for a democratic system. This creates ‘popular bribing’ in which the regime uses the rent money to pacify the democratic demands of its people. On this, see: Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State, (Croom Helm Publishers, 1987)
[xiv] Quoted in interview: Lars Hedegaard, ‘Interview: A continent of losers,’ The Free Press Magazine, May 2007, http://www.sappho.dk/interview-a-continent-of-losers.htm.


 

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

US-Islam Forum, Doha QATAR


2012 U.S.-Islamic World Forum Plenary Sessions



Religious conflict in Nigeria?

posted by David Sloane
The Immanent Frame 


May 29, 2012


At GlobalPost, Heather Murdock explains that, for locals, conflict between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria’s “Middle Belt” is not entirely about religion:
Both Muslims and Christians in Jos are quick to point out that when they clash, it’s not usually about religion or ethnicity. Some locals say the fight began over land and political rights. Others say poverty is at the heart of the conflict. Politicians are blamed for exacerbating the situation by playing people against each other. After years of escalation and retaliation the two communities are now terrified of one another.
It all started over disputes between farmers and nomadic cattle herders who need fields to graze their animals, according to humanitarian worker Aliyu Dawobe Ladduga. The farmers involved in the conflict are generally Christians who are from the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere ethnic groups. The herdsmen are Muslim Fulanis, said Ladduga, who himself comes from a family of Fulani cattle herders.
Ladduga says regular violence emerged in the past decade because the population is growing rapidly and both groups are running out of land.
However, Murdock notes that, coincidentally, the rise of violence overlaps with an era of increased fundamentalism amongst both Muslims and Christians in Nigeria:
The conflict is coupled with a rise in fundamentalism across the country, deepening the separation between the two sides, said Nigerian political scientist Hussaini Abdu. “This is not just about Islam,” he told GlobalPost. “Even among Christians there is this increasing surge of back-to-source fundamentalism.”
Read the full article here.


Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt: The Road Not Yet Traveled


 By  Nadine Sika
 
 May 29, 2012

MUFTAH


*Nadine Sika is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the American University in Cairo.



In December 2011, the State Security apparatus cracked down on civil society institutions, mainly human rights organizations and international foundations, contending that they pose a national security threat to the Egyptian state.  This onslaught and the discourse surrounding it had been a regular issue within the Egyptian government prior to the January 25th revolution. However, after the revolution, civil society actors expected more freedoms, supported by new laws that would advance their independence from the state.  The timing of the crackdowns, almost one year after the revolution, is a clear indication that civil society actors’ optimism for a democratic transition is becoming no more than a mirage.  The governing elite, especially the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) – which holds the highest executive powers in the interim – is not willing to advance a real democratization process, which expands the public sphere for more liberties, equality, free and fair elections, and the due process of law.

This analysis will shed light on the historical development of civil society organizations in Egypt, and more specifically, the role of the state both prior to and after the January 25th revolution in obstructing their independence and in impeding the road to democratization.  The study will shed light on the similarities and differences between the current regime’s crackdown on civil society, and those that occurred during the regime of Hosni Mubarak.

A Historical Look at Civil Society in Egypt : A Tool for Embedding Authoritarianism

Civil society organizations, especially religious ones, have been prevalent in the Egyptian public sphere since the 19th century.  Their role has always been to complement the Egyptian government in providing social services to the poor. In the early 1990s, the Mubarak regime embarked on an economic liberalization process, which was aided by the structural adjustment projects of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  In addition to the economic conditionalities imposed by these institutions, they have advocated for civil society organizations to assist the state in development.  In 1994, the International Conference on Population and Development was held in Egypt, which was a milestone for the promotion of civil society organizations as partners in the new economic liberalization process. The number and scope of civil society organizations increased exponentially from almost 10,000 in 1998 to almost 30,000 by 2008.[i] Half of these constitute development and religious associations. The rest is composed of sports, youth, social clubs, trade and industry chambers, professional syndicates, and trade and workers unions.[ii] Different ministries have endorsed the development of civil society organizations as well.  For instance, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Youth have created channels for cooperation with NGOs on gender sensitive approaches, population growth, and the promotion of youth clubs across the country.[iii]

Historically, civil society organizations, especially professional unions and syndicates, were dominated by the state.  Workers have 23 organized trade unions, which are part of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Egypt.  Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the federation did not enjoy credibility amongst its members, because of its close association with the state.[iv] There are 21 syndicates in Egypt. The most active and semi independent are the Bar Association, the journalists, the medical doctors, and engineers associations. Syndicates were mainly dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the 1980s and 90s; however, the state enacted Law 100/1993 to hamper the Islamsits’ hegemony in these syndicates,[v] which became dominated by members of the then ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) from the end of the 1990s until the ousting of Mubarak in 2011. Other associations, such as teachers and commerce groups, have historically supported government policies, and they have rarely undertaken independent actions.[vi] For the sake of enhancing state legitimacy, and not for supporting political opposition to the state, the government tolerated business associations and chambers of commerce. These bodies have mostly supported the economic liberalization policies, which the Mubarak regime forcefully enacted at the dawn of the new millennium. As a result, these associations and chambers have historically relied on the state to protect their economic interests, and consequently they did not challenge the regimes’ authority. Rather, they have flourished economically as a consequence of their positive relationship with the state.[vii] Hence the regime was able to develop these bodies as an extension of the state and not as an independent civil society that would enrich the public sphere.

The Mubarak regime envisioned an increase in the number and scope of CSOs to promote economic and social development under the state’s auspices, without any adherence to their role in promoting democratization. Accordingly, civil society law number 32/1964, which was highly restrictive to the freedom of civil society, was effective until 2000.  It was replaced briefly by a more liberal law, number 153/1999; however, this was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court, on the grounds that it had not been submitted to the Shura Council (Upper House) for deliberations before being enacted as a law. Three years later the government enacted law 84/2002, a highly restrictive piece of legislation on civil society’s freedoms. It stipulates that all non-profit organizations should be registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity or face criminal penalties. In addition, this Ministry must approve the different activities of civil society organizations, and the Ministry has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of any organization and dissolve it if it receives foreign funds or if it is affiliated with  international groups without official  permission.[viii]

While the Mubarak regime tolerated syndicates, unions, business associations and service-based organizations, it continued to harass pro-democracy actors like human rights organizations and non-religious social movements, regularly accusing them of being agents of foreign regimes or “spies” seeking to destroy the Egyptian state.  Two of the most famous defaming and arbitrary arrests and detention cases were against directors of human rights organizations in 1998 and 2000.  The first case was against Hafez Abou Seada, the Director of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, who was detained as a consequence of a human rights report that blamed the security apparatus for torturing and unlawfully detaining 100 Egyptian Copts in al-Koshh village in Upper Egypt.  The second was against Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Professor at the American University in Cairo (AUC) and Director of Ibn Khaldun Center for Human Rights, whose organization monitored the 2000 Parliamentary elections. He was detained for allegedly receiving “unlawful” funds from foreign foundations, publishing misinformation and corruption.[ix]

State security harassment against pro-democracy organizations and activists did not stop after the enactment of the civil society law in 2002. In 2004, activists from new protest movements like Kifaya, Youth for Change and April 6th were regularly harassed, arbitrarily abducted, detained, and arrested.[x] The Egyptian regime, along with the public media, referred to these as “minority spies”[xi] in order to legitimate harassment against them. In 2007, the state dissolved the Human Rights Association for Legal Aid, allegedly for receiving aid from foreign associations without the consent of the Ministry of Social Solidarity. In 2008, central security forces physically attacked the medical team of the al-Nadeem Center for Prisoners’ Rights due to their prison inspections. In 2009, officials from the Ministry threatened to dissolve the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights for receiving “unlawful funds.”[xii] As a consequence of these defamatory campaigns in the state media, Egyptian public opinion has by and large been skeptical of human rights organizations. For instance, in 2008, Ahmad Abdel Hady, the president of the Egyptian Youth Party, accused members of the April 6 movement of being agents of foreign donors who had strategic interests in Egypt.[xiii]


Civil Society in the Post-January 25th Egypt:  A Chance for Democracy?

The roles pro-democracy organizations played, especially protest movements like Kifaya, Youth for Change and the April 6th movement, were central to the January 25th revolution.  With the onset of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, these movements were able to mobilize Egyptians through new framing techniques, which combined both economic rights with political rights such as “food, freedom, human dignity.” There were also various street campaigns calling for the end of corruption. After the dynamics of the 18-day uprising that escalated with the ouster of Mubarak from power, the role of pro-democracy actors was highly appreciated both on the Egyptian street and within the SCAF. Nevertheless, the honeymoon between the pro-democracy movements and organizations and the SCAF did not last long. State security personnel detained many activists only two weeks after Mubarak’s ouster.  More problematic was the raiding of five human rights organizations, the shutting down of one, and the arrest of several Egyptian and foreign workers allegedly for distributing  and receiving illegal foreign funds—an act that posed a national security threat to Egypt.[xiv] The accusations against these activists and organizations, and the public media coverage of them, were virtually the same as they were during the Mubarak regime. In particular, the public media discourse failed to transcend the Mubarak era, continuing to portray pro-democracy organizations and activists as “spies” against the Egyptian State.[xv]

More constraints against civil society organizations are contained in the new civil society draft law, which was released in January 2012. The draft law poses more restrictions on associational freedoms than law 84/2002.  For instance, according to this draft law, associations will only be allowed to work on issues of social justice and development; severe criminal penalties may be imposed on unregistered organizations; and organizations are required to receive prior approval from the Ministry of Social Solidarity before accepting foreign funds and affiliating with other foreign organizations.[xvi]

Conclusion

It is clear that the ruling elite in post-January 25th Egypt does not want civil society organizations to become independent from the state.  On the contrary, the state wants to continue dominating these organizations to ensure its hegemony over society.  However, new trends in civil society activities have emerged since the January 25th revolution.  Civil society actors – not only pro democracy activists and organizations, but also members of different syndicates and associations – have advocated for “independence” from the state.  Since the ousting of Mubarak, almost 300 independent unions have been established, the most important of which are independent labor unions that have sporadically developed in different governorates to protect the interests and the rights of workers.[xvii] These unions have taken to the streets as their main “space” of contention. Labor activists mobilize workers to demonstrate, conduct sit-ins against their business managers or against the government, until their legal rights are met. These include their right to bonuses, minimum wage and better working conditions. The state still meddles with the institutionalization and legalization of these unions, but nevertheless union activists are not giving up on their right to independence, and they continue to organize demonstrations on a regular basis.

With different civil society actors insisting on gaining independence from state hegemony, these new and emerging dynamics are important steps in developing a strong, vibrant and independent civil society that can pave the way for democracy. However, despite these positive developments, the defaming campaigns, the crackdown against different pro-democracy activists and the new Draft Law on civil society are clear indicators that the SCAF regime is unwilling to move Egypt toward a real democratization process, which expands the public sphere for more freedoms, civic and political participation, and free, fair and periodic elections.



*Nadine Sika is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the American University in Cairo.



[i] UNDP, Egypt’s Social Contract: The Role of Civil Society (Cairo: UNDP,  2008).

[ii] Hamdy Hassan, “Civil Society in Egypt under the Mubarak Regime,” Afro-Asian Journal of Social Sciences 2, no. 2.2 (Quarter II, 2011), 1-18.

[iii] Center for Development Services, An Overview of Civil Society in Egypt:  Civil Society Index Report for the Arab Republic of Egypt ( Cairo: Center for Development Services, 2005)

[iv] Mustapha K. Al-Sayyid, “A Civil Society in Egypt?” The Middle East Journal 47, no. 2 (Spring, 1993):  228-242.

[v] Hassan, “Civil Society in Egypt under the Mubarak Regime.”

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Amy Hawthorne, “Middle Eastern Democracy:  Is Civil Society the Answer,” Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series 44 (March, 2004).

[viii] Transparency International, National Integrity System Study:  Egypt 2009, (Cairo: Transparency International,  2010).

[ix] Mohamed Mukhtar Kandil, Al-hiwar 3431(2011), available at http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=267883 (accessed on March 27, 2012).

[x] See the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights’ Report  from 2004 onwards concerning the detention of activists, available at http://www.en.eohr.org.

[xi] 6th April Movement. “For the third year in a row April 6 youth challenge Egypt’s ruling Democratic Party,” available at http://6april.org/english/modules/news/article.php?storyid=16 (accessed on March 27, 2012).

[xii] Transparency International, National Integrity System Study:  Egypt 2009 (Washington: Transparency International, 2009)

[xiii] Mohamed Gharib, “Political parties against April 6 Movement,” Al Masry al-Youm, May 4, 2008.

[xiv] May Shams El-Din, “Security forces prosecutors raid five NGOs, shut,” The Daily News Egypt.com, available at http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/human-a-civil-rights/security-forces-prosecutors-raid-five-ngos-shut-down-one-dp2.html (accessed March 28th, 2012)

[xv] See for instance al-Ahram coverage of the NGOs’ prosecutions from December 30, 2011 until February 2012.

[xvi] The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Restrictive Draft CSO Law Announced by Egyptian Ministry of Social Justice and Solidarity,” available at  http://www.icnl.org/news/2012/26-Jan.html (accessed March 28th, 2012).

[xvii] Omayma Kamal and Mohamed Gad, “Indpendent Unions:  Stories of A Nation that Rises Up,” (Arabic) Al-Shorouk News, March 27,  2011.


Bahman Baktiari

Sunday, May 27, 2012

APPLYING THE LESSONS OF IRAQ TO SYRIA



By NADIM SHEHADI

Nadim Shehadi is an associate fellow at Chatham House, the
Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

LONDON ­ There is no doubt that the Iraq war experience is not to be
repeated. This conviction is driving policy toward Syria, but the West has
learned the wrong lessons from the Iraq example. The United States
military intervention in 2003 and the chaos and waves of sectarian killing
that followed in Iraq haunts the West into indecision, and irreparable
damage is being inflicted on Syrian society.
The world stands by and watches while the Syrian regime violently
represses the uprising, increasing sectarian tensions and radicalism,
while sanctions erode the economy and weaken the middle class. The longer
this lasts the closer Syrian society will move toward fulfilling President
Bashar al-Assad?s prophecy that his regime?s fall would be worse than
?tens of Afghanistans.?
There is a different lesson to be learned from policy toward Iraq before
2003, the period when Saddam Hussein was ?engaged,? became an ally of the
West by fighting Iran and was kept in power even after his invasion of
Kuwait for fear of the unknown if he fell.
From 1991 to 2003, the West allowed the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein to
drive Iraqi society back to the Stone Age and contributed to the process
with policies of containment. Sanctions punished the Iraqi people while
strengthening the regime. Saddam flourished under the oil-for-food program
by distributing oil coupons to his supporters in Arab countries and
financing his lobbyists in the West. Devaluation of the currency meant
that the middle class was driven to poverty and those who were lucky to
emigration.
During the Gulf war in 1991, the arguments against going all the way to
Baghdad and dislodging Saddam after the liberation of Kuwait are similar
to those used now for not intervening in Syria. Fear of the aftermath kept
Saddam in power, with a secret hope that he would be overthrown internally
through a military coup or an assassination. Iraqis were encouraged to
rise against the regime and when they did, thinking the Americans would
support them, the United States looked the other way as tens of thousands
of Shiites and Kurds were slaughtered. This worsened ethnic and sectarian
tensions and radicalism.
An Iraqi transition to democracy would have been much smoother in 1991,
despite the country?s coming out of two wars. Policy toward Iraq before
that included engagement with the regime and Western support for it in the
Iran-Iraq war. While he was an ally of the West, Saddam was allowed to gas
and massacre the Kurds and other minorities. The nightmares of the Anfal
campaign against the Kurds, and Halabja ­ where more than 5,000 Kurds died
in a gas attack ­ haunt the world and are part of the legacy Iraq must
deal with. The regime survived all these years by killing its people,
eroding its institutions and hollowing out civil society. Two whole
generations of Iraqis suffered from the West?s engagement with and support
of Saddam since 1980.
There is a price to pay when keeping a dictatorship in power, and there is
also a price to pay after removing it. The number of casualties in Iraq
before 2003 are different from the numbers seen after 2003, but the toll
on the population was profound. Iraq after 2003 was not only recovering
from the invasion, but also from 24 years of being battered by a brutal,
dictatorial regime. Inaction on Syria will have similar consequences.
Syrians cannot liberate themselves from the Assad regime without
international support. The regime will stop at nothing to remain in power.
We must also not forget that Syria, together with Iran and other countries
in the region, contributed to the post-2003 mess in Iraq by supporting the
insurgency. Syria also facilitated the infiltration of terrorists
sympathetic to Al Qaeda.
A post-Assad Syria, however, will not face the same regional challenges.
Political culture has changed radically from the days when Saddam Hussein,
Hosni Mubarak, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Muammar
el-Qaddafi and other despots thrived through extortion and blackmail. None
of these regimes ever had an interest in seeing Iraq reform. Assad himself
boasted that Syria was indispensable to stability in the region because it
could help resolve the problems it created in conflicts like Iraq, Lebanon
and among Palestinians.
Meanwhile the delusion that negotiation with Assad can lead to a peaceful
transition and that the regime will cooperate is still maintained. The
regime will continue to play mind games and gain time in the hope that the
wind will again blow in its favor and that it will be able to suppress the
revolt. Lessons from Iraq illustrate what a big mistake it is to allow
this illusion to continue.



Saturday, May 26, 2012

Egyptian Elections: Choices between the old Order and Islamist Candidate


The New York Times


May 26, 2012

Some Disdain Both Options in Egypt’s Narrowed Race


CAIRO — Faced with what seemed like an impossible choice — between a conservative Islamist with a rigid social agenda and a former minister with deep ties to the Mubarak government — Ahmed Abdel Fattah, 33, said he planned to sit out the remainder of the voting for Egypt’s president and hope for better choices in four years.
“I am not going to play in this dirty game,” Mr. Abdel Fattah, a subway worker, said Friday, explaining why he could not support either Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, orAhmed Shafik, President Hosni Mubarak’s final prime minister, who will compete in a runoff vote next month. “This is not democracy. These elections are a joke.”
For some voters, the bubbling enthusiasm that ushered in the country’s landmark presidential election has given way to anger and apathy since candidates who generated excitement, with charisma or progressive appeals, were eliminated from the race.
Sensing the disillusionment, and the likelihood that many voters could stay home, Mr. Morsi and Mr. Shafik moved Saturday to widen their support, courting disqualified candidates and portraying themselves as more centrist — sometimes by drastically reversing their previous positions.
At a news conference in Cairo on Saturday afternoon, Mr. Shafik, who had in the past compared Egypt’s youthful revolutionaries to a disrespectful child, now praised the “martyrs” of the uprising and promised to return the fruits of the “glorious revolution” to the youth.
He urged people to vote in the June runoff, and spoke kindly about several of his competitors, including Hamdeen Sabahi, the founder of a Nasserist party whose populist campaign drew millions of voters, giving him a surprising third-place finish in the unofficial vote tallies.
Saying he was willing to collaborate with other Egyptian political forces, Mr. Shafik also sought to quiet fears that he represented the government of his friend Mr. Mubarak, saying, “There is no turning back.”
The Muslim Brotherhood, meanwhile, tried to ease a different strain of voter anxiety: fears that the Islamist group, which holds roughly half the seats in Parliament, will dominate Egyptian politics if Mr. Morsi is elected. Brotherhood officials were trying to meet with several of the disqualified candidates on Saturday to discuss a possible coalition to challenge Mr. Shafik.
But that effort seemed to run aground, as two former candidates, Amr Moussa and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, released statements saying they were not endorsing Mr. Morsi or any candidate, though they did not say whether that would change in the future.
And Mr. Sabahi, whose supporters are coveted by both remaining candidates, seemed to be trying to keep his own campaign alive on Saturday. A lawyer representing him told Reuters that the campaign had appealed to the presidential election commission to halt the runoff for reasons that include allegations of “irregularities” during the first round of voting.
Also on Saturday, former President Jimmy Carter, who led a delegation that monitored the first round of the elections, said there were “many violations” but added that they did not “violate the integrity of the elections as a whole.”
Speaking at a news conference in Cairo, Mr. Carter said restrictions placed on his organization by the Egyptian authorities were the strictest the group had faced in 25 years, and as a result it was not able to certify the process as “proper.”
He added, “The Egyptian people have accepted the process we have seen over the last few days as quite successful.”
Even so, many Egyptians threw up their hands at the results. Some argued that the outcome was inevitable: that an electorate battered by a chaotic transition and under temporary military rule would easily reach for candidates who appealed to fear rather than hope.
“They made the people reach the level where all they can think about is security and food on the table,” Mr. Abdel Fattah said.
Nadia Ibrahim, 34, a housewife, articulated a common concern, that the election was threatening to pull Egypt backward.
“I can’t bring myself to vote” in the runoff, she said. “If the Muslim Brotherhood wins, they will be another N.D.P.,” she added, referring to the National Democratic Party, the former governing party, whose burned-out headquarters on the Nile is a testament to the revolution’s anger.
“If Shafik wins, the N.D.P. will be back,” she said. “This is a decision I can’t bring myself to morally make.”
Hussein Gohar, 45, a gynecologist who is a leading member of the liberal Egyptian Social Democratic Party, argued for a different approach, saying that voters whose candidates lost needed to think strategically about Egypt’s future, and pick their battles.
“I’d rather fight against Shafik,” he said.
“If I fight the Muslim Brotherhood, I’m the minority. If I fight against Shafik, I have more revolutionary forces with me,” he said, arguing that the opposition needed to unite.
For many other people, though, the election worked exactly as it was supposed to.
Mohammed Abdel Moneim, 35, a taxi driver, said that though he was not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, he and his family had been impressed by its appeals during the campaign.
“They’re organized, they have a project and they’re not thieves,” he said, adding that if the Brotherhood performed poorly, Egyptians would surely make their displeasure felt, perhaps by returning to protest in Tahrir Square.
“We’re no longer afraid,” he said. “If they’re not good, the square is always there.”
Dina Salah Amer contributed reporting.
Bahman Baktiari



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